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Person-Task Fit: Emotional Consequences of Performing Divergent Versus Convergent 1 
Thinking Tasks Depend on Need for Cognitive Closure  2 
 3 
Abstract 4 
We investigated how people high (vs. low) in the Need for Cognitive Closure (NFC) 5 
experience working on divergent and convergent thinking tasks. Based on the notion of 6 
person-task fit we hypothesized that individuals high in NFC (but not those low in NFC) 7 
would feel less competent when solving divergent (vs. convergent) thinking tasks, because, 8 
being open-ended, divergent thinking tasks do not offer closure. We also predicted that, 9 
consequently, high NFC individuals would experience less positive emotions and more 10 
negative emotions when performing a divergent (vs. convergent) thinking task. To test this 11 
idea, we measured NFC among participants (N = 549) from five European countries and 12 
asked these participants to complete a divergent (vs. convergent) thinking task and to appraise 13 
their own competence and emotions. Participants high in NFC (but not these low in NFC) felt 14 
less competent and experienced less positive and more negative emotions when solving a 15 
divergent (vs. convergent) thinking task. The association between task type and emotions was 16 
mediated by perceived competence but only for participants high in NFC. 17 
 18 
Keywords: creativity; divergent thinking; convergent thinking; need for closure; 19 
competence; person-environment fit; person-task fit; emotions 20 
 21 
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1. Introduction 23 
Why do some people like to come up with multiple possibilities, whereas others stick 24 
to the first solution that comes to their mind? A trait that differentiates between these 25 
contrasting preferences is need for cognitive closure (NFC). NFC reflects a stable 26 
dispositional preference for order and predictability, an urgent desire to reach decisions, 27 
affective discomfort with ambiguity, and “closed-mindedness” (Webster & Kruglanski, 28 
1994). NFC manifests itself in motivational rigidity, which has been shown to have a wide 29 
range of consequences for psychological functioning, information processing, and decision 30 
making (Kruglanski, 2004; Roets, Kruglanski, Kossowska, Pierro, & Hong, 2015). For 31 
example, a lack of closure – when no definitive conclusion has been reached – is aversive to 32 
high NFC individuals and causes distress (Roets et al., 2015; Roets & Van Hiel, 2008). 33 
In this paper, we extend the research on the consequences of NFC by applying the 34 
notion of Person-Environment fit (P-E fit; e.g., Kristof‐Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 35 
2005). As argued by P-E fit theories, individuals working in an environment (e.g., an 36 
organization, a team, or a job) that suits their personalities and fulfills their needs will 37 
function and perform better than those who experience a misfit (Edwards & Shipp, 2007). 38 
Building on this idea, our paper focuses specifically on person-task fit, which has been rarely 39 
studied in the P-E fit literature (Finucane, Mertz, Slovic, & Schmidt, 2005) and, to the best of 40 
our knowledge, has not been examined in relation to NFC (but for related evidence on 41 
Personal Need for Structure see Rietzschel, Slijkhuis, & Van Yperen, 2014a, 2014b; Slijkhuis, 42 
Rietzschel, & Van Yperen, 2013). Thus, we examine whether NFC affects how people 43 
respond to different types of tasks.   44 
In particular, we propose that tasks varying in the extent to which they provide closure 45 
will (vs. will not) fit the needs of people differing in NFC. In doing so, we specifically focus 46 
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on convergent versus divergent thinking tasks (Guilford, 1950, 1967). In convergent thinking 47 
tasks a single correct solution is required, but in divergent thinking tasks the aim is to generate 48 
as many diverse responses as possible. Closure should be easily achieved by reaching the 49 
correct solution in convergent thinking tasks, implying a high person-task fit for people high 50 
in NFC. However, closure may be not achieved in the process of generating multiple 51 
possibilities in divergent thinking tasks, implying a person-task misfit for people high in NFC. 52 
We further propose that the degree of person-task fit will have momentary-level consequences 53 
for how people experience the situation in terms of their feelings of competence and their 54 
emotional responses to the task at hand. 55 
 To test these hypotheses, we conducted a multi-group study in five language samples, 56 
in which participants completed a divergent (vs. convergent) thinking task and evaluated their 57 
competence and emotions during the task. We aimed to extend the P-E fit framework by 58 
showing the effects of fit at the momentary level (i.e., fit between personality and the task at 59 
hand), and to provide a novel perspective on the consequences of NFC in terms of 60 
experienced competence and emotions when working on different types of tasks.  61 
1.1 Need for Cognitive Closure and Person-Environment Fit 62 
NFC relates to individual needs regarding knowledge, and influences the way people 63 
think; NFC is a desire for any definitive answer to a question, and fulfilling this desire is 64 
experienced as urgent by high NFC individuals (Kruglanski, 2004). People high in NFC 65 
engage in a rigid processing style to reduce uncertainty, which has a wide range of 66 
consequences (Kruglanski, 2004; Roets et al., 2015). For example, motivational rigidity at 67 
high levels of NFC relates to a limited number of hypotheses generated before forming a 68 
judgement and to increased judgmental confidence (Mayseless & Kruglanski, 1987).  69 
Furthermore, people high in NFC follow the task strategy employed by other solvers (Jaśko, 70 
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Czernatowicz-Kukuczka, Kossowska, & Czarna, 2015) as well as adopt the strategy cued in 71 
the task instructions (Szumowska, Kossowska, & Roets, 2018). This does not necessarily 72 
imply that high NFC individuals work less hard on any task, because high NFC people are 73 
willing to exert more effort when closure can be achieved only through effortful strategies 74 
(Szumowska, Szwed, Kossowska, & Wright, 2017; see also Sankaran, Szumowska, & 75 
Kossowska, 2017). Importantly, high-NFC individuals may experience negative emotions as 76 
long as no closure is reached: Absence of a definitive answer during task completion triggers 77 
distress and aversion especially among high NFC individuals (Roets & Van Hiel, 2008).  78 
We propose that the combination of high dispositional NFC and a situational 79 
opportunity to reach closure represents a good person-environment fit (P-E fit; e.g., 80 
Kristof‐Brown et al., 2005), whereas the combination of high NFC and a lack of opportunity 81 
to reach closure represents a misfit. In general, when P-E fit is high, the environment either 82 
aligns with or complements the individuals’ needs or preferences. P-E fit has been mostly 83 
examined in relation to work outcomes, such as work attitudes (e.g., job satisfaction and 84 
organizational commitment) and turnover intentions (Verquer, Beehr, & Wagner, 2003), but 85 
also in relation to mental and physical health, and in relation to task performance (Edwards & 86 
Shipp, 2007). Meta-analyses have shown that P-E fit indeed relates to higher job satisfaction, 87 
organizational commitment, and task performance (Hoffman & Woehr, 2006; Kristof‐Brown 88 
et al., 2005). For instance, for high NFC people P-E fit may be high in routine jobs with clear 89 
rules, whereas it may be low in jobs requiring spontaneity and quick adaptation to change (cf. 90 
Billing, Bhagat, & Babakus, 2013). 91 
P-E fit has not been explored in relation to how people high (versus low) in NFC 92 
function in tasks that provide them with more or less opportunities to achieve closure (but for 93 
related evidence see Rietzschel, Slijkhuis, & Van Yperen, 2014a, 2014b; Slijkhuis, 94 
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Rietzschel, & Van Yperen, 2013). We suggest that these kinds of tasks – which provide or do 95 
not provide closure – are represented by convergent and divergent thinking tasks, respectively 96 
(Guilford, 1950, 1967). In convergent thinking tasks, people are required to find a single 97 
correct solution (e.g., a correct answer in a multiple choice test; the correct word in a 98 
crossword puzzle), whereas in divergent thinking tasks, people are asked to provide many 99 
different answers with no clear distinction in terms of correct versus incorrect solutions (e.g., 100 
novel uses of a bottle; cf. Colzato, Szapora, Lippelt, & Hommel, 2014). Convergent thinking 101 
tasks are by definition closed-ended, in that a single correct answer exists and task progress 102 
can usually be verified. Consequently, we propose that convergent thinking tasks grant high 103 
NFC individuals the opportunity to reach closure, which provides a good fit with the needs of 104 
those individuals. In contrast, divergent thinking tasks are by definition open-ended tasks, in 105 
which closure cannot readily be achieved, and in which task progress may be unclear. 106 
Therefore, in our view, this type of task entails a misfit for high NFC individuals. Our basic 107 
prediction is that the (mis)fit between convergent (vs. divergent) thinking tasks and NFC will 108 
affect feelings of competence, which will, in turn, affect emotional functioning. 109 
1.2. Emotional Consequences of Person-Task Fit 110 
We firstly propose that the fit or misfit between NFC and task type (convergent vs. 111 
divergent) will influence the extent to which individuals feel competent while completing the 112 
task. In fact, people high (vs. low) in NFC have been shown to perform worse on divergent 113 
thinking tasks at both the group (Chirumbolo, Livi, Mannetti, Pierro, & Kruglanski, 2004; 114 
Chirumbolo, Mannetti, Pierro, Areni, & Kruglanski, 2005) and individual level (Sankaran, 115 
Grzymala-Moszczynska, Strojny, Strojny, & Kossowska, 2017). This seems at least partly the 116 
result of a personality-task misfit. Since high NFC individuals want to reach closure, they 117 
pressure fellow group members into conforming to others, and this behavior is incompatible 118 
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with the goal of generating many options (as opposed to one correct option; Chirumbolo et al., 119 
2005). Similarly, high NFC individuals tend to feel threatened by creative tasks (Sankaran, 120 
Grzymala-Moszczynska, et al., 2017), which may result from a person-task misfit, and which 121 
ultimately undermines their performance. Thus, because of a person-task misfit, high NFC 122 
individuals tend to underperform in divergent thinking tasks, and will therefore feel lower 123 
levels of competence during these tasks as compared to low NFC individuals. 124 
In contrast, high NFC individuals may feel relatively competent on convergent 125 
thinking tasks, because they may experience increased judgmental confidence in these tasks 126 
(but not in divergent thinking tasks). As argued by Mayseless and Kruglanski (1987), when 127 
confronted with a problem, people high in NFC are not motivated to generate multiple 128 
alternative hypotheses or solutions, because this would threaten their existing knowledge 129 
structures. Rather, due to their motivational rigidity, they prefer to stick to the first available 130 
solution. If alternative solutions were generated, it would decrease confidence in the first 131 
solution, which would threaten closure. In support of this idea, Mayseless and Kruglanski 132 
(1987) found that participants high in NFC not only exhibited higher confidence in their 133 
initial response than those with low NFC, but also generated fewer alternative answers to the 134 
problem.  135 
Increased judgmental confidence of people high in NFC should have consequences for 136 
how competent they feel during convergent and divergent thinking tasks. In convergent 137 
thinking tasks, high NFC people could (in principle) stop after the first satisfactory solution 138 
has been found. Because they are motivated to reach closure and justify such closure 139 
(Kruglanski, 2004), they are likely to be overconfident in that answer, and experience 140 
elevated levels of competence. However, divergent thinking tasks require the generation of 141 
multiple alternatives, and thus, subjective confidence in each solution should be lower. 142 
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Together with uncertainty about reaching closure in open-ended tasks, this lower confidence 143 
should decrease experienced competence among high NFC people during divergent thinking 144 
tasks. As it is not important or urgent for people low in NFC to obtain closure, their feelings 145 
of competence should not vary depending on task type. 146 
H1: High NFC people will experience higher competence when completing 147 
convergent thinking tasks than when completing divergent thinking tasks; this effect is 148 
not found among low NFC individuals. 149 
Secondly, based on two theories, we propose that perceived competence will have 150 
consequences for positive and negative emotions experienced during the task. Firstly, 151 
according to self-determination theory, satisfaction of the basic psychological needs for 152 
competence, relatedness, and autonomy contributes to positive emotions and well-being 153 
(Deci, Olafsen, & Ryan, 2017). For example, a meta-analysis (Van den Broeck, Ferris, Chang, 154 
& Rosen, 2016) has shown that satisfaction of the need for competence is a unique predictor 155 
of intrinsic motivation and well-being. Even more relevant work by Schmierbach, Chung, 156 
Wu, & Kim (2014) found momentary-level effects of competence on well-being: Engaging in 157 
a more difficult game decreased feelings of competence, which in turn diminished overall task 158 
enjoyment. Thus, self-determination theory suggests that feelings of competence will improve 159 
emotional functioning and will be positively associated with positive emotions and negatively 160 
with negative emotions. Secondly, cognitive appraisal theory of affect and emotions suggests 161 
that control appraisals strongly influence emotional experiences (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter 162 
Schure, 1989; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). For example, feelings of reduced control (i.e., not 163 
being in control of the situation) are associated with reduced happiness and increased 164 
frustration (Landau, Kay, & Whitson, 2015; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Because experienced 165 
competence signals high control, we expected that experienced competence relates to more 166 
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positive emotions and less negative emotions. Given that emotions are not only characterized 167 
by valence (positive – negative), but also by activation (activating – deactivating) (Russell, 168 
Weiss, & Mendelsohn, 1989; Vittersø, Oelmann, & Wang, 2009), we examined the effects on 169 
positive activating emotions (e.g., interest and engagement), positive deactivating emotions 170 
(e.g., contentment and pleasure), and negative activating emotions (e.g., frustration). Since 171 
Roets and Hiel (2008) found no effects on negative deactivating emotions (e.g., sadness, 172 
tiredness), we did not include those. 173 
H2: Experienced competence is positively related to (activating and deactivating) 174 
positive emotions and negatively related to activating negative emotions. 175 
Overall, research has shown that the opportunity to engage in divergent thinking tasks 176 
can be quite motivating and enjoyable. For example, Bujacz et al. (2016) found that solving 177 
divergent (vs. convergent) thinking tasks increased positive emotions through increased 178 
feelings of autonomy (see also Chermahini & Hommel, 2012). However, Hypotheses 1 and 2 179 
suggest that this conclusion may not apply to everyone. Rather, they suggest that divergent 180 
thinking activities (as compared to convergent thinking) could decrease positive emotions and 181 
increase negative emotions among people high in NFC, and that this relation is mediated by 182 
experienced competence. Our final hypothesis therefore is:  183 
H3: Divergent tasks lead to lower positive and higher negative emotions as mediated 184 
by experienced competence but only among individuals high in NFC. 185 
2. Method 186 
2.1 Participants and Design 187 
The study was conducted in Austria, Italy, Ireland, Poland, Sweden, and the UK. 188 
Ethical approval was granted from ethical committees in each country, and 863 adults 189 
participated in the online study across all countries. Participants were recruited through 190 
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university websites and social networks, and informed consent was obtained from all 191 
participants. Of the sample, 289 participants withdrew from the study prior to task 192 
assignment. Data from 25 participants (3% of the total sample) were subsequently excluded 193 
from the analyses: 5 participants had missing values on predictor variables, and 20 194 
participants spent less than twenty seconds or more than twenty minutes on a task. We 195 
assumed that those who spent too little time were insufficiently motivated, while those who 196 
spent too much time may have been distracted by other activities. In total, data from 549 197 
participants were analyzed (divided by language groups into 159 English, 73 Swedish, 106 198 
Italian, 121 Polish, and 90 German; 71% women; age range 18 to 69; M = 28 years, SD = 199 
9.6). Participants were randomly and automatically assigned to a divergent thinking or 200 
convergent thinking task condition and they could subsequently choose one out of three 201 
(divergent or convergent, depending on condition) tasks that they wanted to solve. 202 
Divergent thinking tasks used in his study were: (1) generating cartoon titles  (n = 203 
128; Sternberg, 2006), (2) listing different uses for a rubber band (n = 85; Guilford, 1967), 204 
and (3) improving design of a table for people with impaired vision (n = 54; Kim, 2006). All 205 
tasks required providing multiple (rather than one) potential solutions and offered no 206 
opportunity to verify when sufficient progress has been made, i.e., had no limits and no 207 
indication on how many ideas was enough (e.g., “list as many ideas as you wish.”).  208 
Convergent thinking tasks used in this study were: (1) spotting the differences 209 
between two cartoons (n = 214), (2) answering questions about a presented book excerpt (n = 210 
46; Sacks, 2008), and (3) writing instructions on how to assemble a table based on given 211 
illustrations (n = 22). The convergent thinking tasks were pre-tested so that their difficulty 212 
was similar to those of the divergent thinking tasks (Bujacz et al., 2014, 2016). In all of these 213 
tasks, people were required to find the only correct solution (or limited set of solutions) and 214 
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could verify their progress while solving the task, i.e., they could recognize that the goal has 215 
been met when they provided the answer. 216 
2.2 Measures1 217 
All items used in the study were translated from the English versions. We employed a 218 
7-point response format where 1 = “not at all”, 4 = “moderately”, and 7 = “very much”. See 219 
Table 1 for the correlations among all study variables. 220 
Need for closure (NFC) was measured with fifteen items of the brief version of the 221 
Need for Closure Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011; e.g., “I don’t like situations that are 222 
uncertain”; α = .85 across the various language groups). 223 
Competence was measured using two items (“I had a chance to show how capable I 224 
am”, “I felt that I’m good at what I’m doing”) from the satisfaction of the need for 225 
competence scale (Longo, Gunz, Curtis, & Farsides, 2016; Van den Broeck, Vansteenkiste, 226 
De Witte, Soenens, & Lens, 2010; r = .68). 227 
Emotions were measured using five items taken from the Basic Emotions State Test 228 
(BEST; Vittersø, Oelmann, & Wang, 2009), one representing active negative emotions 229 
(“annoyed”), two representing active positive emotions (“interested”, “engaged”), and two 230 
representing passive positive emotions (“content”, “pleased”). Active and passive emotions 231 
were distinguished for exploratory reasons, because some research suggests that they relate to 232 
different motivational states (Higgins, 1997) or have a different relation with (creative) 233 
performance (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008). 234 
2.3 Procedure 235 
The study was conducted online. The data for this study were collected as part of a 236 
larger international project on creativity and well-being (Bujacz et al., 2014). Previously 237 
                                                          
1 Since our hypotheses concerned affective responses to performing convergent vs. divergent tasks, and due to 
the difficulty in reliably assessing performance among different language samples, we chose to not report any 
performance results.  
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published papers used the same dataset (Bujacz et al., 2014, 2016), but the key variables 238 
(NFC and competence) used in the present research have not been reported before. Need for 239 
closure was measured first, alongside other personality questionnaires (see Bujacz et al., 2014 240 
for a complete list of questionnaires). Next, participants were randomly assigned to the 241 
divergent or convergent thinking task condition. Afterwards, they chose one task (out of 242 
three) that appealed to them the most. Participants assigned to the convergent thinking task 243 
condition chose one out of three convergent thinking tasks; an analogical choice of three 244 
divergent thinking tasks was given in the divergent thinking task condition.  245 
As mentioned, these tasks were pre-tested and confirmed to vary on difficulty level 246 
(see Bujacz et al., 2014, 2016). However, participants were not informed that the tasks varied 247 
in difficulty; they were only provided with a short description of each task. In this way, 248 
participants were able to make an informed choice and perform the task that best matched 249 
their preferences. This procedure has the advantage that fit or misfit effects between task type 250 
and NFC are not due to specific tasks, to their level of attractiveness, or to their level of 251 
difficulty. The disadvantage is that different participants performed different tasks. To address 252 
this issue, we controlled for task difficulty in the analyses2.   253 
Participants had unlimited time, but time-on-task was measured. On average, it took 254 
about 5 min to solve a task (see Table 1), and across groups, participants spent less time on 255 
divergent than on convergent thinking tasks (Δ = 2.68 minutes; p < .001). Time-on-task was 256 
used as a control variable throughout. Immediately after task completion, participants’ 257 
experienced competence, positive emotions, and negative emotions were measured in 258 
reference to the task (i.e., “How did you feel while solving this task?”). 259 
                                                          
2 We also analyzed only the data of those participants who chose to perform the easy task. All 
results remained similar and conclusions identical. Effect sizes were equally strong or 
stronger. 
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2.4 Analytic strategy 260 
The dataset included five subsamples collected in different languages. These samples 261 
were systematically compared to empirically test for the equivalence of results across 262 
samples, following the assumptions of multivariate meta-analysis (Jackson, Riley, & White, 263 
2011). To account for mean score differences due to language and cultural factors, all 264 
variables were standardized and group mean centered. We tested our hypotheses using a 265 
moderated mediation model (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007) estimated on manifest 266 
variables (i.e., mean scores across test items). The model controlled for the effects of gender, 267 
age, task difficulty, and time-on-task on both the mediator (competence) and the outcome 268 
variables (emotions). Indirect effect tests used bootstrapping with 10,000 samples (e.g., 269 
Preacher & Hayes, 2008).  270 
All analyses were performed with Mplus version 8 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017). 271 
For the evaluation of a model, the following fit indices were used with the respective cut-off 272 
values indicating good model fit: CFI above .95; RMSEA below .05; and SRMR below .10 273 
(Williams, Vandenberg, & Edwards, 2009). For model comparison, the BIC difference was 274 
used with a value higher than 10 providing strong evidence against the model with the higher 275 
BIC value (Kass & Raftery, 1995). 276 
3. Results 277 
The moderated mediation model (see Figure 1) with all effects, apart from control 278 
variables’ effects, constrained to equality across language groups fitted the data very well 279 
(χ2[76] = 95.54; RMSEA = .048; CFI .978; SRMR = .046; BIC = 6005.32), and fitted 280 
significantly better than the same model with all structural paths allowed to vary freely across 281 
language groups (ΔBIC =  383.88). Thus, relations were comparable and the results 282 
generalized across groups. 283 
PERSON-TASK FIT 
   13 
 
NFC was related to competence (b = .17, p = .005, SE = .06), but not to emotions 284 
(b = -.02, p = .773, SE = .05 for passive positive emotions; b = -.02, p = .71, SE = .05 for 285 
active positive emotions; b = .02, p = .700, SE = .06 for active negative emotions). In support 286 
of Hypothesis 1, the effect of task type (convergent task = 0, divergent task = 1) on 287 
competence was moderated by NFC (b = -.20, p = .015, SE = .08). For people high in NFC, 288 
task type predicted competence (b = -.28, p = .037, SE = .13), but not for people low in NFC 289 
(b = .12, p = .33, SE = .13; see Figure 2).  290 
Furthermore, experienced competence was positively related to both passive (b = .65, 291 
p < .001, SE = .03) and active (b = .59, p < .001, SE = .03) positive emotions, as well as 292 
negatively to active negative emotions (b = -.27, p < .001, SE = .04). This supported 293 
Hypothesis 2. Consequently, we found significant indirect effects from task type through 294 
competence to positive and negative emotions but only for people high in NFC (b = -.18, p = 295 
.040, SE = .08, 95% CI [-.36; -.01] for passive positive emotions; b = -.17, p = .041, SE = .09, 296 
95% CI [-.33; -.01] for active positive emotions; b = .08, p = .047, SE = .04, 95% CI [.01; .16] 297 
for active negative emotions). For people low in NFC, these indirect effects were statistically 298 
non-significant (b = .08, p = .33, SE = .08, 95% CI [-.08; .24] for passive positive emotions; b 299 
= .07, p = .33, SE = .07, 95% CI [-.07; .22] for active positive emotions; b = -.03, p = .34, SE 300 
= .03, 95% CI [-.11; .03] for active negative emotions). Furthermore, the direct effect of task 301 
type on active and passive positive emotions was statistically non-significant at all levels of 302 
NFC. The direct effect of task type on active negative emotions was statistically significant 303 
only for people with mean level of NFC (b = -.24, p = .021, SE = .10). Taken together, this 304 
suggests full mediation for positive emotions and partial mediation for active negative 305 
emotions. These results support Hypothesis 3.  306 
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An estimation of explained variance suggested a medium effect size for positive 307 
emotions (R2 between .37 and .43 for active positive emotions and between .41 and .47 for 308 
passive positive emotions) and a small effect size for negative emotions (R2 between .10 and 309 
.16 for active negative emotions) across language groups.  310 
4. Discussion 311 
Building on the person-environment fit literature, we proposed that the degree of fit 312 
between Need for Cognitive Closure (NFC) and the possibility of attaining closure in a given 313 
task influences feelings of competence and emotions during the task solution; we also 314 
suggested that experienced competence mediates the interactive effect of task type and NFC 315 
on emotions. More specifically, we predicted that high (but not low) NFC people would feel 316 
less competent and would experience less positive emotions and more negative emotions in 317 
tasks that deprive them of the opportunity to reach closure as compared to tasks that offer 318 
them such an opportunity. 319 
In line with our expectations, we observed that high NFC people experienced less 320 
competence while performing a divergent than a convergent thinking task and that these 321 
feelings of competence in turn related to less positive emotions and more negative emotions. 322 
In contrast, task type had no effects on participants low in NFC. This result suggests that the 323 
open-ended nature of divergent thinking tasks can exert a significant influence at high levels 324 
of NFC. Such tasks lack the opportunity for closure, and decrease subjective competence and 325 
worsen emotional functioning of people high in NFC. These effects may generalize to a wide 326 
range of convergent and divergent thinking tasks as well as different language samples, since 327 
three different types of divergent and convergent thinking tasks were used and hypotheses 328 
were tested on five language samples. 329 
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Our findings extend the literature on P-E fit. Although researchers have examined the 330 
effects of fit between personality and job (Kristof‐Brown et al., 2005), organization (Hoffman 331 
& Woehr, 2006; Kristof‐Brown et al., 2005), or environment in general (Sen, Acar, & 332 
Cetinkaya, 2014), rarely have they investigated fit between personality and a task at hand (but 333 
see Rietzschel, Slijkhuis, & Van Yperen, 2014a, 2014b; Slijkhuis, Rietzschel, & Van Yperen, 334 
2013). We found that the fit between personality (NFC) and type of activity (solving a 335 
convergent vs. divergent thinking task) increases feelings of competence, and indirectly 336 
improves emotional functioning at high levels of NFC. This finding corroborates the idea that 337 
environmental resources may help fulfill individual needs (needs-supplies fit). However, this 338 
idea has mostly been examined at the group, organizational and vocational level, while our 339 
findings show the effects at the level of specific tasks (cf. Edwards & Shipp, 2007). 340 
Although we did not find that task type mattered for people low in NFC, this should, 341 
of course, not be taken to mean that P-E fit is not important for these people. For one thing, 342 
this group of respondents probably comprises both those who simply do not have a high need 343 
for closure as well as those who would actually prefer not to have closure (i.e., a high need to 344 
avoid closure). The latter group may well respond differently to tasks that require actual 345 
decision-making, and would presumably prefer to generate more and more ideas and options.  346 
Furthermore, the present findings shed light on the emotional consequences of NFC, 347 
and extend the findings of Roets and Van Hiel (2008). These authors used tasks that required 348 
participants to provide a single correct answer, but achieving this answer was severely 349 
hindered (because of short exposure times or unclear rules), leading to negative emotions 350 
among high NFC individuals. We have shown that high NFC people can experience not only 351 
less negative emotions but also more positive emotions when a single solution is available 352 
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(convergent thinking tasks) as compared to when multiple alternative answers are required 353 
(divergent thinking tasks).  354 
Our results suggest that the fit between personality and task type influences 355 
experienced competence, which in turn impacts positive and negative emotions. This 356 
perspective is supported by self-determination theory (Deci et al., 2017), which claims that 357 
satisfaction of the basic psychological need for competence has positive consequences for 358 
well-being. It is also supported by cognitive appraisal theory of emotions, in which the 359 
experience of control is positively linked to positive emotions, such as happiness, and 360 
negatively to negative emotions, such as frustration (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). More 361 
generally, feeling competent may closely reflect a feeling of control over one’s environment, 362 
and such control has long been associated with optimal functioning (Maier & Seligman, 363 
2016). In addition, the theoretical assumption of competence causally influencing emotions 364 
has an important implication: Frequently solving tasks that fit (or not) one’s level of NFC 365 
could have long-lasting effects on well-being. This intriguing possibility may be worth 366 
investigating in the future research. For example, if high-NFC employees work in a job or a 367 
work environment where their need for closure is routinely thwarted (e.g., if a coworker or 368 
supervisor repeatedly postpones decisions, or crucial information is not shared by the 369 
organization), their decrease in perceived competence could have serious long-term 370 
ramifications for their emotional well-being. 371 
However, from another theoretical perspective, it is also possible that experienced 372 
emotions influence feelings of competence. According to feelings-as-information theory 373 
(Schwarz, 2011), affect serves as diagnostic information for the task at hand. Negative affect 374 
signals high task demands, novelty, and that processing requires substantial effort. In contrast, 375 
positive affect signals fluent processing, and is connected to liking and familiarity. Since 376 
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people high in the NFC experience distress when they cannot attain closure, negative affect 377 
accompanying distress may also spill over into other evaluations and serve as a diagnostic 378 
information about lower competence. All in all, more research is needed to test whether and 379 
how competence and emotions causally influence each other, and how these relations play out 380 
over time in a real-world context.  381 
Finally, our findings highlight the role of NFC in creativity research. Although it has 382 
been studied as a predictor of creative performance (e.g., Chirumbolo et al., 2004, 2005), it 383 
may also be an important moderator in studies that manipulate task type and use tasks with 384 
only one correct solution versus tasks with multiple potential solutions. An example of a task 385 
that has only one correct solution, and in which progress can be verified, is the Remote 386 
Associates Test (RAT; Mednick, 1962). The RAT requires participants to find one common 387 
associate for three words provided. Various studies examined reactions triggered by the RAT 388 
(Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2010, 2012; Fischer & Hommel, 2012). For example, 389 
according to the control-state approach to creativity (Hommel, 2012; Hommel, Akbari 390 
Chermahini, van den Wildenberg, & Colzato, unpublished manuscript) solving divergent and 391 
convergent thinking tasks triggers different control states, which either allow broad 392 
exploration and flexible switching between options (divergent thinking) or restrict processing 393 
towards the specific goal (convergent thinking). Our results suggest that high NFC may be an 394 
important boundary condition for such effects, because people high in NFC experience lower 395 
competence and more negative emotions in divergent thinking tasks as compared to 396 
convergent thinking tasks. Due to that, divergent thinking may trigger a different control state 397 
at high (vs. low) levels of NFC. 398 
While our results show that the fit between NFC and the task at hand contributes to 399 
perceived competence and positive emotions, the fact remains that people cannot always 400 
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avoid situations that do not fit their needs. Especially in the modern workplace, people are 401 
likely to be confronted with both open-ended, divergent, and more closed-ended and 402 
convergent tasks. While this did not matter much to our low-NFC participants, it made a 403 
substantial difference for high-NFC participants. This may have training implications: 404 
Perhaps there is something to be gained by giving people (e.g., employees) the opportunity to 405 
acquire more of a behavioral repertoire for precisely those tasks they would normally tend to 406 
avoid. 407 
 To conclude, this research demonstrated that the effects of task type on experienced 408 
competence and emotions depend on NFC. People high in NFC respond positively to tasks 409 
that offer the opportunity to achieve closure but negatively to tasks that do not (such as 410 
divergent tasks), whereas low NFC people’s reactions are less sensitive to task type. These 411 
person-task fit effects may have important consequences for well-being at work, especially in 412 
times when demands for divergent thinking and creativity are ever increasing. 413 
  414 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Among Study Variables  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 M SD 
1. Task -         0.49 0.50 
2. NFC -.01 -        3.96 0.97 
3. Competence -.13** .05 -       4.27 1.64 
4. Passive positive emotions -.03 .03 .66** -      4.08 1.51 
5. Active positive emotions -.08 -.01 .62** .70** -     4.73 1.46 
6. Active negative emotions -.02 .02 -.26** -.33** -.29** -    2.11 1.50 
7. Gender .03 .10* -.06 .01 .02 -.08 -   0.71 0.46 
8. Age -.02 .05 .12** .15** .11** -.09* -.06 -  28.1 9.60 
9. Time on task  -.37** -.13** .18** .15** .22** -.05 -.13** .20** - 4.48 3.62 
10. Difficulty .28** -.10* -.07 -.02 .05 .06 -.15** -.01 .24** 1.51 0.72 
Note. Task is coded 1 = divergent, 0 = convergent. Variables 2 through 6 were standardized and group mean centered in the analysis, 
means and standard deviations of unstandardized variables are presented in the table. Gender is coded 1 = women, 0 = men. Time on 
task is presented in minutes. Difficulty is coded 1 = easy, 2 = medium, 3 = difficult.  
* p < .05; ** p < .01  
 
Table 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Moderated mediation model invariant across language groups 
Note. Task type is coded 1 = divergent, 0 = convergent. All relations control for gender, age, task 
difficulty, and time on task. All but control variables’ effects constrained to equality across 
groups. Need for closure (NFC), competence, and emotions are standardized and group-mean 
centered.   
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
task type competence 
passive positive 
emotions 
active positive 
emotions 
NFC 
-.08 
-.20* 
.65** 
.59** 
active negative 
emotions 
-.27** 
Figure 1
 Figure 2. Interaction task type and NFC on competence  
Note. Low NFC is 1 SD below the mean and high NFC is 1 SD above the mean. Need for closure 
(NFC) and competence are standardized and group-mean centered.  
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